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South Africa‟s Equity market provides a large (in terms of volume) but concentrated investment environment. Domestic 
pension funds are restricted from diversifying globally and are thus faced with a restricted set of investment 
opportunities. This article describes and quantifies the extent of the concentration on the JSE historically and at present. 
The article describes the consequent limitations on long-only equity portfolio construction and the implications for the 
domestic long-only fund manager subject to various active weight limits. The analysis shows that the higher the 
allowable active bet sizes, the less consistently asset managers are able to implement their views and the less symmetric 
their response to forecasted excess returns can be. Consequently, the less competitive a long-only fund manager can be 
alongside hedge funds and similarly constrained long-short managers. 
 
 





The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), over 120 years 
old
1





 in capitalisation among the world‟s stock 
exchanges at 790 billion US Dollars
3
. Although South 
Africa‟s equity exchange is one of the largest among 
emerging markets, the JSE represents a highly concentrated 
equity offering. The FTSE/JSE All Share Index (J203) is an 
index of approximately165 companies‟ shares and 
represents 99% of the total market capitalisation of all 
tradeable
4
 ordinary shares in South African companies listed 
on the main board of the JSE
5
. Figure 1 illustrates the 
concentration
6
 of the JSE by depicting the contribution of 
various shares and groups of shares to the total value of the 
index. Figure 2 depicts the current weight of each individual 
company in the All Share Index and the cumulative 
contribution of each share to the index‟s total weight.  
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Founded in 1887. 
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JSE Equity market profile, 1
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Only “free-float” shares are included in this index. 
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Ground Rules for the Management of the FTSE/JSE Africa Index 
Series, July 2009, version 1.8. 
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As at end of February 2009 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1 and 2, the All Share Index has 
more than 20% of its weight in the largest two mining-
resources companies. The largest five companies together 
make up more than 40% of the index. The seven biggest 
companies out of the total 165 represent 50% of this index 
and the largest 15 companies (less than 10% of the number 
of companies listed) comprise more than two thirds of this 
index.  
 
Historical concentration on the JSE 
 
In less than 10 years, the annual volume traded on the JSE 
Equities markets has increased by a multiple of 7 (refer to 
Figure 3). This increased market activity has not brought a 
material change to the South African equity market‟s size 
ranking in the world nor has it attracted greater diversity in 
terms of the listings on the main board. In fact, since the 
existence of the new JSE/FTSE indices, there has been little 
appreciable improvement in its concentration, as Figure 4 
will show. Thanks to a declining number of companies 
included in the All Share Index from 1997 to 2001
7
 and the 
relative success of South Africa‟s two largest resource 
companies since 2001, the All Share Index has, in fact, 
become more concentrated.  
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“The JSE Actuaries indices were replaced by the FTSE/JSE Africa 
Index Series on the 24th of June 2002. FTSE and the JSE provided 
historic data of the indices for the period July 1995 to December 2001 
and the indicative values from the 2nd of January 2002 to the 21st of 





Figure 1: The distribution of (market capitalisation) weights on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
 
 
Figure 2: The Distribution of (market capitalisation) weights on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
 
An article on the subject of diversification (Strongin, Petsch 
and Sharenow, 2000) introduced a measure of the “effective 
number” of shares
8
 as a summary statistic of the 
concentration in a benchmark or market index. This 
effective number of shares measures how many shares the 
index would have if it was an equally-weighted index, given 
its actual distribution of weights. On this basis, as shown in 
                                           
8
The effective number of shares is calculated by taking the inverse of 
the sum of squares of the index weightings. For example, if the J203 
was an evenly weighted index, the effective number of shares would be 
165.  
Figure 4, since 2000 the All Share Index has never had more 
than an effective 25 shares!  
 
 Since late 1999, more than half the All Share‟s market 
capitalisation has vested in the top 10 shares and more than 
two thirds of the index has been represented by the largest 
20 shares. Considering the fact that the JSE All Share Index 
represents 99% of all unconstrained equity available for 
investment in South Africa, this index is a very good 
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Figure 3: Rand Value Traded on the JSE Annually 
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Figure 5: Number and Effective Number of Shares on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index over Time 
 
Concentration in developed markets 
 
In a similar way to Figure 1, Figure 6 compares the 
concentration of four major global indices to the JSE All 
Share. The accompanying Table 1 illustrates the 
concentration of several of these developed market indices 
and shows that, as an index, the JSE All Share Index is not 
unique in its concentration in a handful of large companies.  
 
As this article will show, the concentration of an index or 
benchmark can materially constrain investment decisions 
and the portfolio construction processes, particularly when 
each investment is constrained to be held long. 
Consequently, global investors with particular mandates 
which are represented by these indices, suffer similar 
implied restrictions on account of index concentration as 
South African investors. However, when their collective 
investment opportunities are considered in the light of their 
potential global diversification, the effective concentration 
in their dollar-weighted investment universe is greatly 
reduced.  
 
By contrast, South African investors, who are restricted by 
exchange controls from unconstrained global diversification, 
have little reprieve from their concentrated investment 
universe. Currently the pension fund regulations in South 
Africa allow for a maximum foreign investment (across all 
asset classes) of 20%. It is not uncommon for countries to 
restrict their pension funds‟ investments to domestic markets 
in this way. The Russian Federation has recently doubled 
their pension funds‟ foreign investment allowance from 10% 
to 20% from 2010 onwards; Brazil and Mexico both allow a 
maximum of 20% in foreign investment; Switzerland‟s 
pension funds and Korea‟s defined contribution funds allow 
a maximum of 30% foreign investment and Columbia 
allows 40%
9
. For this reason, a study of the implications of 
equity market concentration on fund management 
opportunities is particularly important in domains where 
geographical diversification is restricted and domestic 




In a recently published article (Kruger & Van Rensburg, 
2008) explored the risk implications of the concentration 
inherent in the established JSE equity indices in 2002: the 
All Share (ALSI), Share-weighted
10
 (SWIX), Capped 
(CAPI) and various combinations of the Resource (RESI) 
and Financial and Industrial (FINDI) indices. The authors 
provide a good review of the advantages and disadvantages 
of the use of these indices as investment benchmarks for 
professional fund managers. In particular, they compare 
their levels of concentration and find the All Share to be the 
most concentrated. Capped indices and indices that provide 
lower exposure to resource shares in general, provide an 
obvious remedy to the concentration of South Africa‟s 
equity market in two big resource shares. The JSE will, in 
the near future, launch an equally-weighted index which will 
further address the concentration issue. 
 
 
                                           
9
Survey of investment regulation of pension funds, October 2009, 




The share-weighted index attempts to represent the collective free-
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Figure 6: The Distribution of index weights on four major indices and the JSE 
 
Table 1: Index weight of shares on the JSE All Share Index and four other developed market indices 
 
 JSE All Share FTSE 100 Nikkei 22511 Nasdaq Dow Jones Industrial 3011 
Largest Share BHP Billiton 13,9% HSBC Holdings  9,0% Fast 
Retailing 
6,5% Apple  15,6% IBM 9,3% 
2nd Largest Share Anglo 
American 
7,6% BP  8,4% Fanuc  3,1% QUALCOMM 5,7% Chevron  5,8% 
3rd Largest Share Sasol 6,7% Vodafone 5,4% Kyocera  3,1% Microsoft  5,6% 3M Co 5,7% 
4th Largest Share S A Breweries 6,5% Royal Dutch 
Shell  
4,9% Softbank  2,7% Google Inc 5,2% Exxon Mobil  5,5% 
5th Largest Share MTN 6,4% Glaxo 
SmithKline  





Next 5 Shares  16,6%  15,9%  10,2%  12,6%  19,9% 
Next 10 Shares  15,2%  21,4%  14,8%  14,3%  35,3% 
Next 20 Shares  12,7%  15,2%  16,5%  15,7%   
Remaining Shares  14,5%  15,1%  40,8%  22,2%  13,5% 
Average Weight  0,61%  0,98%  0,44%  1,00%  3,33% 
Median Weight  0,14%  0,34%  0,21%  0,52%  3,08% 
Number of Shares in the Index  165   102   225   100   30  
Effective number of Shares  21   29   69   24   23  
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To some extent, these solutions are artificial. Specially-
designed benchmarks provide a yardstick against which to 
assess active performance against the same benchmark. In 
this way fund sponsors can carve out focussed management 
styles and less concentrated mandates. Capping or reducing 
the weight in large shares in the fund‟s benchmark enables a 
less concentrated carve-out of the investment mandate. 
Sharpe (1991) points out that the average actively managed 
rand (i.e. capitalisation weighted) cannot, before costs, 
deliver performance different to the average passively 
managed rand, by virtue of basic arithmetic. Consequently, 
when considering the average invested rand, which 
represents the wholesale equity landscape, only a 
capitalisation-weighted index will do and, as such, South 
Africa‟s market remains concentrated despite these bespoke 
benchmarks.  
 
The creation of the SWIX specifically had the domestic 
pension fund investor in mind. This index excludes foreign 
holdings in dual listed shares and thereby, because of the 
dominance of the dual listed resource shares, provides a less 
concentrated representation of the opportunity set of equity 
investment to domestic pension funds compared to the All 
Share. Unfortunately, the SWIX is unable to remove all 
foreign holdings from the index as this information is not 
readily available and so the adjustment is not, in that sense, 
fairly applied. For this reason, in this analysis, the All Share 
is used instead of the SWIX to represent the domestic 
investor.  
 
For the most part, Kruger and Van Rensburg (2008) are 
concerned with the lack of diversification in the various 
benchmarks and the contribution of that lack of 
diversification to the risk of funds that use them as 
benchmarks. While issues of diversification are certainly 
important, particularly in a small, concentrated investment 
universe such as South Africa‟s, this article is concerned 
with the application of portfolio construction in this 
environment. (Grinold, 1994) responded to criticisms of 
portfolio optimisation procedures as “alpha eaters
12
”: that 
good excess return forecasts are distorted by portfolio 
optimisation procedures and the resulting portfolios 
consequently generate less of the profit (“alpha”) which they 
ought to. In developing the “Fundamental Law of Active 
Management”, (Grinold, 1994) shows that, if forecasts are 
treated as a product of residual volatility (which is assumed 
to be independent across shares) times skill (as measured by 
the information coefficient) times a standardised score, the 
resulting optimised portfolios will not exhibit the same bias 
toward low residual shares. (Grinold, 1994) does not 
mention the alpha “eating” effect of constraints on portfolios 
(and optimisers) but offers practical advice on how to turn a 
stock tip, a buy/sell list or a series of multiple forecasts into 
an alpha that “won‟t get eaten”.  
 
Clarke, De Silva and Thorley (2002) and Clarke, De Silva 
and Sapra (2004) continued this work by developing the 
“Generalised Fundamental Law of Active Management” and 
introducing the concept of a transfer coefficient. The authors 
illustrate the loss of excess risk-adjusted performance that 
can result from portfolio constraints, particularly the long-
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In other words, consumers/wasters of potential excess return. 
only constraint. They use the transfer coefficient to quantify 
the extent of this loss. A transfer coefficient of one implies 
that there is no “friction” between the manager‟s investment 
view or forecast returns and the construction of the 
investment portfolio. A transfer coefficient less than one 
implies a loss of information between the manager‟s 
investment view and the construction of the investment 
portfolio based on this view. The authors have pioneered the 
use of short-extension products which allow for modest 
short positions and have been shown to improve the transfer 
of manager skills to the fund while maintaining a net long 
investment. 
 
The next section presents an analysis of the loss of 
opportunity, and implied decrease of transfer coefficient 
when long-only mandates are exercised in a concentrated 
market such as the South African Equity market. This 
section begins with an introduction to long-only active 
management and continues with an illustration of the extent 
of the decay in the transfer coefficient with increasing active 
weight limits. The conclusion follows. 
 
The implied restrictions of market concentration 
on the active fund management opportunity set 
 
Long-only active portfolio management 
 
Active Portfolio Management is the allocation of fund value 
amongst available investments, viewed relative to a 
benchmark portfolio. The weight of the fund which is 
invested in any particular stock (Wfund,i) is the proportion of 
the fund‟s total value invested in this stock. Clearly, the sum 
of these weights across all investments must add to 100%. In 
an active management framework, the weights of individual 
investments are viewed relative to the weights of these same 
investments in a benchmark or “passive” portfolio and are 
expressed in terms of “active weights” or “active bets”. 
These active weights must sum to zero in order for the 
portfolio to be self-financing. 
 
Equation 1: Definition of active weight in stock   
 
Wactive,i = Wfund,i – Wbenchmark,i 
 
An allocation of the fund‟s value into a particular stock 
which is larger than the benchmark‟s weight in that stock 
would be considered to be a positive active bet on the future 
value of that investment. The fund manager would be 
positioning the fund to earn superior profits relative to the 
benchmark portfolio by being “overweight” in a stock which 
is expected to increase in value. The extent to which the 
fund manager can express conviction by increasing this 
positive active weight is limited only by mandate 
restrictions and the ability to finance this positive active bet 
with negative positions in other shares.  
 
A negative view of the future prospects of a particular stock 
can likewise be implemented in the fund by holding a 
smaller proportion of such a stock in the fund than the 
proportion of the same stock represented in the benchmark. 
The greater the conviction in this negative bet on this stock, 
the less of the stock the fund manager will hold. An 





go so far as to sell the stock short (i.e. Wfund,i < 0) with a 
view to profiting from it‟s future loss in value. Within a 
conventional long-only active mandate, such as those 
typically applied to pension funds in South Africa, the most 
negative expression of the fund manager‟s view in such a 
stock is to omit it from the fund entirely. The smallest 
investment weight of this stock is therefore limited by zero 
(i.e. Wfund,i > 0) and therefore the most negative active 
weight possible in a long only fund is the negative of the 
benchmark weight (Wactive,i > - Wbenchmark,i). 
 
If the capitalisation of the investment universe was 
uniformly distributed i.e. if the equity market was an equally 
weighted universe of shares, the long-only investment 
manager would have equal opportunities to express a view 
in any of the component shares. However, when a stock 
comprises only a small weight in the benchmark or 
investment universe, a long-only manager‟s range of 
potential active weights in that stock becomes non-
symmetrical because, although the positive active weight is 
uncapped, the size of any negative view is limited by the 
stock‟s own weight in the benchmark. 
 
The effect of active weight limits 
 
Fund managers are not usually without limits in terms of the 
risk exposures that they are permitted in the fund or the 
extent of their “active” management. Investment mandates 
usually stipulate the investment universe, fund objectives, 
and risk limits by mutual agreement between the fund 
sponsor and the asset manager. One such risk limit is the 
maximum allowable active weight of the fund in any stock. 
This restriction seeks to avoid large concentration of risk in 
the fund.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates the implications of various sizes of such 
active weight limits on the potential activity of a fund 
manager in the concentrated equity market in South Africa. 
The horizontal axis represents the relaxation from left to 
right of maximum allowable active weights in any stock in 
absolute terms. For example, the extreme limit of 0% would 
represent a perfect All Share tracking fund whereas the 3% 
limit represents a mandate with more scope for aggressive 
active management because it allows for an active weight in 
any stock of anywhere between -3% and 3%. The vertical 
axis of Figure 7 represents the number of shares available to 
the fund manager under each of these restrictions, in which 
the manager has a symmetrical range of opportunity to 
express a negative or positive active view.  
 
 
Figure 7: Maximum number of shares available at each level of active weight 
 
 
For example, at a very conservative active weight limit of 20 
basis points
13
 (bp), the thus constrained active manager can 
potentially express active views anywhere between -20bp 
and 20bp on all 165 shares in the All Share (i.e. - .20% > 
Wactive,i > .20%). This in turn implies equal consideration of 
the opportunities for extra profit from each of these 165 
shares.  
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20bp = 0,20% 
Under a less restrictive limitation, for example a maximum 
allowable active weight of 2%, the manager can only 
consider 13 shares in which the full range of potential active 
weights are possible. That is, ironically, while the 2% limit 
is far less restrictive, in a concentrated market, it effectively 
only allows the more aggressive manager the full range of 
opportunity to express their view (from -2% to 2%) in 13 
out of the 165 shares in their investment universe. The most 
extreme negative bet possible in the remaining 152 shares is 
limited by their weight in the benchmark which is less than 
































































same way as the other 13. Any potential opportunity for 
excess returns in these 152 shares must be considered 
asymmetrically by the fund manager because there is greater 
potential for expressing positive active views in these shares 
than negative views. All things being equal, there would 
therefore be less point in the manager paying attention to 
“sell” signals in these shares than “buy” signals as the 
manager is less able to orientate the fund to take advantage 
of opportunities for profiting from negative forecasts in 
these shares. Thus with greater relaxation of active weight 
limits comes greater asymmetry in the range of 
opportunities available to the fund manager.  
 
Notice from Figure 7 how the opportunity set of shares 
drops by almost two thirds when the maximum allowable 
absolute active view changes from a tiny 0,2% to a very 
slightly larger 0,4%. There is a further 40% reduction in the 
opportunity set with a change in active weight from 0,4% to 
0,8%. This gives us an indication of the small sample of 
shares in which a long-only, aggressive active manager can 
meaningfully express their views both negative and positive 
across the full allowable range of active weights. 
 
In their expression of the Generalised Fundamental Law of 
Active Management, Clarke, De Silva and Thorley (2002) 
introduced the concept of the transfer coefficient. They used 
this coefficient to generalise the Fundamental Law of Active 
Management first proposed by Grinold (1989) to the case of 
constrained portfolios. The transfer coefficient is the extent 
to which a fund manager‟s investment view can be 
expressed in the active weights of the fund. In particular, it 
is the correlation between the risk adjusted forecast returns 
across shares and the active weights of the portfolio.  
 
The best case for the skilled manager is to have a transfer 
coefficient of 1 implying that there is no “friction” between 
the investment forecasts and their expression in the 
portfolio‟s active weights. Decreasing transfer coefficients 
imply a loss of integrity between forecast returns and the 
composition of the fund. Transfer coefficients are 
anticipated to be less than perfect (less than one) in the case 
of constrained investments because the constraints on the 
portfolio contaminate the implementation of a portfolio 
which is exactly true to the manager‟s forecasts. The more 
binding the constraints, the greater the reduction in the 
transfer coefficient. 
 
Table 2 describes the opportunities lost as a consequence of 
active weight limits in a long-only fund investing in the JSE 
All Share Index in a similar vein to Figure 7.  For example, 
a manager who is constrained to express no more than a 
maximum 1% positive view in any stock in the index, has a 
range of 165% of active long positions (refer column 2). An 
unconstrained manager could finance these with 
symmetrical short positions, thereby creating a total 
opportunity set of 328% possible active weights (column 4) 
for the unconstrained manager. By contrast, a similarly 
constrained long-only fund manager, who is unable to sell a 
stock short, cannot take a negative active position which is 
more negative than each stock‟s own weight in the 
benchmark. Such a manager would be able to generate a 
maximum of 1% underweight in each of only 22 out of the 
165 shares. The maximum possible negative position in the 
remaining 143 shares would be limited by their individual 
benchmark weights. As such, the long-only manager thus 
constrained would have a range of only 47% in total 
negative active weights (refer column 3). Therefore, the 
total opportunity range for such a manager is 211% possible 
active weights (164% plus 47% - refer column 5). This 
implies that a long-only manager with a 1% active weight 
limit has only 64% (211% of 328%) of the opportunities that 
a similarly constrained long-short manager has at this active 





Table 2: Implied Transfer Coefficient at Various Active Weight Limits for the Long-Only Investor in the JSE All Share 
 
Maximum limit 
on active bet 
Sum of maximum 
possible positive 
active weights 













0,00% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1,00  
0,10% 17% 12% 33% 29% 0,87  
0,20% 33% 20% 66% 53%  0,81  
0,50% 83% 34% 165% 117% 0,71  
0,75% 124% 42% 248% 166% 0,67  
1,00% 165% 47% 330% 212% 0,64  
2,00% 330% 62% 660% 392% 0,59  
5,00% 825% 84% 1650% 909% 0,55  








Referring to the Fundamental Law of Active Management, 
Information Ratio is Transfer Coefficient (TC) times 
Information Coefficient (IC) times breadth. Therefore, if 
two managers both have the same investment opportunities 
from which to choose (breadth) and the same success at 
predicting returns (IC), the one with the higher Information 
Ratio will, by definition, be the one who best reflects their 
expected risk-adjusted returns in their portfolio i.e. the one 
with the higher transfer coefficient.  
 
Clearly, with increased maximum active weight limits, come 
increased opportunities for active management and 
increased expectation of risk taking relative to a passive 
investment. However, with increased active weight limits, 
the long-only manager‟s opportunity set becomes 
increasingly restricted relative to a long-short manager 
thereby allowing a long-short manager an increasing 
competitive advantage in a more aggressive active 
management environment. 
 
Figure 8 charts this evidence by depicting the decrease in 
Implied Transfer Coefficient with increasing active weight 
limits. At an active weight limit of 15% (larger than the 
largest stock in the All Share), the decay in the transfer 
coefficient reaches it‟s minimum of 0,52 - roughly half the 
information lost when the portfolio is formed. However, 
note the rapid decay in transfer efficiency within the first, 
relatively conservative active weight limits. From the active 
weight range of a pure tracker to a very conservative 
enhanced index fund, the loss of opportunity decreases 
materially. At a fairly reasonable active management limit 
of 1%, the long-only investment in the JSE All share is 
already hamstrung to the order of a 30% relative to their 
hedge fund counterparts.  
 
 





Active fund managers can only express their views in an 
environment where their conviction and level of risk taking 
is commensurate with their constraints. The higher the 
allowable active bet sizes, the less competitive a long-only 
fund manager can be alongside hedge funds and similarly 
constrained long-short managers. This competitive 
disadvantage is exacerbated by a concentrated 
benchmark/investment environment such as the JSE indices 
where only a few of the shares comprise most of the total 
investment weight.  
 
The more constrained the investment environment, both 
with regard to mandated constraints and the concentration of 
South Africa‟s equity market, the less consistently asset 
managers are able to implement their views and the less 
symmetry there is in their range of potential responses to 
forecasted excess return. Short sale restrictions, in 
particular, are intended to avoid incurring a liability on the 
portfolio‟s behalf. However, the impact of short sale 
restrictions combined with mandated constraints on active 
weights in a concentrated market serve, not to limit risk 
levels, but to artificially concentrate the level of active 
investment activity in a handful of listed companies.  
 
The disadvantage to active management within more 
aggressive active weight allowances, speaks to the success 
of low active risk, enhanced-index type strategies in the 
South African market. In a long-only, concentrated 
environment, low risk active strategies provide investors 
with the best “bang for their buck” because long-only fund 
managers have the opportunity to act more fully on their 




































equities at these low active weight limits. By contrast, to 
compel or encourage long-only managers into a more 
aggressive active space in a concentrated investment 
environment is, ironically, only to constrain them further in 
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